Technology Changes In Aeronautical Systems by Krodel, Jim
HAL Id: hal-02269834
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02269834
Submitted on 23 Aug 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Technology Changes In Aeronautical Systems
Jim Krodel
To cite this version:
Jim Krodel. Technology Changes In Aeronautical Systems. Embedded Real Time Software and
Systems (ERTS2008), Jan 2008, Toulouse, France. ￿hal-02269834￿
Technology Changes In Aeronautical Systems 
                                       Jim Krodel 
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Engines 
400 Main Street  
East Hartford, CT 06118 USA  
 
 
 
Abstract: Guidance for producing airborne software 
today must be developed to the expectations of ED-
12B/DO-178B “Software Considerations in Airborne 
Systems and Equipment Certification”.[1] EASA and 
the FAA have formally recognized this ‘objective-
based’ aviation software guidance and it has proven 
to be extremely successful in the development of 
safe, in-service, operational aircraft containing 
software. Since its publication in 1992, ED-12B/DO-
178B has gain respect as a standard that meets the 
goals of safety in the airborne community. However 
recent technology advances such as Object Oriented 
Technology, Model Based Design, Software Tools 
and Formal Methods have applied methods that 
require elaboration of how the ED-12B/DO-178B 
objectives will be met. This paper discusses the 
approach for introducing new technologies with 
legacy aviation standards. 
Keywords: Formal Methods, Object Oriented 
Technology, Model, Airborne Software, Software 
Technology, Software Approval 
1. Introduction 
ED-12B/DO-178B has established the respect of the 
aviation community, but it has also gained respect in 
other domains such as rail, nuclear, and medical. 
Even today, after 15 years of use, the guidance in 
ED-12B/DO-178B remains a viable approach to 
support the certification of aviation systems. 
However the emergence of software related 
technologies over these past 15 years has 
‘stretched’ how certification applicants apply these 
technologies given the original foundations laid in 
ED-12B/DO-178B. International certification 
authorities have drafted several papers to assist with 
the application of these technology issues such as 
Object Oriented Technology, but this approach does 
not permit the general aviation software developer to 
participate in the paper or position development. 
Clearly, the certification authority wants to recognize 
how to properly apply these technologies, but 
because of the noteworthy safety record of ED-
12B/DO-178B, they are cautious of new technology 
adoption. On the other hand some of these 
technologies can provide additional safety benefit in 
handling the large computer intensive systems being 
built into today’s aircraft. This dilemma is being 
worked by the joint international group WG-71 / SC-
205. This group is working to retain the successful 
core tenets of ED-12B/DO-178B, while permitting a 
mechanism to introduce technology specific or 
method specific supplemental guidance.  
2. ED-12B/DO-178B 
2.1 Early Development of ED-12B/DO-178B 
ED-12B/DO-178B provides a means of developing 
software for airborne systems and although other 
means are possible, the excellent aviation software 
safety record since ED-12B/DO-178B’s inception 
demonstrates its effectiveness. 
 
ED-12B/DO-178B was originally based on the 
FARs/JARs of both the US and European aviation 
regulatory authority and was developed jointly by 
RTCA, Inc. based in Washington, DC and 
EUROCAE based in Malakoff, France. Both RTCA 
and EUROCAE form special committees and 
working groups to develop guidance in producing 
aviation systems. In this case they jointly formed 
guidance to develop software in airborne systems 
and equipment. The aviation certification authorities 
have recognized the software guidance developed 
by these joint groups since the mid 1990’s, but when 
we considers the several years it took to generate 
this guidance we can see that the guidance is based 
on software technology knowledge as it was in the 
mid 1980’s.  
 
To build an airborne certified system, several other 
standards are used including ARP-4761 (Safety 
Methods), ARP-4754 (System Development 
Process), DO-254 (Hardware Development 
Process), and of course ED-12B/DO-178B (Software 
Development Process). ED-12B/DO-178B is used 
once the system is defined and safety requirements 
are allocated to the software. Certifying a system is a 
multi-step process as defined by the previously 
mentioned documents. Figure 1 shows how these 
documents and steps interrelate. 
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Figure 1: ED-12B/DO-178B System Development 
 
Step 1: With the aircraft requirements, determine the 
functions to be performed. 
 
Step 2: Perform an Aircraft Functional Hazard 
Assessment (FHA) per ARP4761 and identify failure 
conditions and effects. 
 
Step 3: These failure conditions and effects permit 
effective allocation of the system requirements 
 
Step 4&5: With system functions established a 
system Functional Hazard Analysis can be 
performed to develop the systems architecture 
(redundancy, safe modes of operation, etc.) 
 
Step 6: A Preliminary System Safety Assessment 
(PSSA) is then performed on the system architecture 
based on the system FHA to determine if the 
associated requirements and architecture meet 
safety objectives. 
 
Step 7: Finally, the system (including the supporting 
software) can be implemented. 
 
There are other considerations, throughout this 
process such as a Common Cause Analysis (CCA) 
on the system, its architecture and associated 
implementation to avoid any common mode errors. 
With these steps completed, a proper System Safety 
(SSA) Assessment and a demonstration of 
compliance to these guiding documents, the system 
can be certified. 
 
It is clear with this view of the system development 
that software is simply part of the overall system and 
ED-12B/DO-178B simply guides developers what to 
do to permit usage of that software on the system. 
Indeed ED-12B/DO-178B tells the user “what” 
should be done to develop systems with software, 
but not “how”. The how is defined by the developer 
via their plans.  
 
A set of plans such as Plan for Software Aspects of 
Certification (PSAC), Software Quality Assurance 
Plan (SQAP), Software Configuration Management 
Plan (SCMP), Software Verification Plan (SVP), and 
Software Development Plan (SDP) provides insight 
into the approaches to defining how the user will 
meet the objectives of ED-12B/DO-178B as applied 
to the requirements, design, code and verification 
processes of the developing software. 
 
2.2 Maturity of ED-12B/DO-178B 
After several years of ED-12B/DO-178B use, it was 
clear that new software techniques were starting to 
stress the interpretation of its words and as such 
other standards documents were needed and 
created to further clarify and support ED-12B/DO-
178B. For example in 2001, ED-94B/DO-248B was 
written and contains a set of discussion papers and 
frequently asked questions that assists in 
understanding the objectives to be met for those 
developing aviation software.[2] In fact with the 
advent of new techniques since the inception of ED-
12B/DO-178B, the task of approving software in 
certified system became very complex and the FAA 
developed their own document called the “FAA Job 
Aid” to assist them and others in understanding 
proper approaches to approving software in airborne 
systems. 
 
New software techniques such as Object Oriented 
Technology, Model Based Design, Software Tools 
and Formal Methods have applied methods that 
require elaboration of how the ED-12B/DO-178B 
objectives will be met. 
3. Object Oriented Technology 
Compliance with the objectives of ED-12B/DO-178B 
is the primary means of obtaining approval of 
software used in civil aviation products. In 1992, 
when ED-12B/DO-178B was born, procedure 
programming was the predominant technique for 
organizing and coding computer programs. 
Consequently, ED-12B/DO-178B provides guidelines 
for software developed using a functional technique. 
OOT is a software development technique that is 
expressed in terms of objects and connections 
between those objects. Since object-oriented 
technology differs from the traditional functional 
approach to software development, satisfying some 
of the ED-12B/DO-178B objectives when using OOT 
may be unclear and/or complicated. 
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Although OOT is intended to promote productivity, 
increase reusability of software, and improve quality, 
uncertainty about how to comply with certification 
requirements has been a key obstacle to using OOT 
in airborne systems.  
 
Due to this difficulty in applying ED-12B/DO-178B to 
the OOT domain, the FAA co-sponsored the Object-
Oriented Technology in Aviation (OOTiA) project 
with the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) to address OOT challenges 
in aviation. The FAA, NASA, and other organizations 
developed workshops and this workshop committee 
produced a handbook specifically addressing object 
oriented technology. [4] 
 
Issues with the technology that arose that were 
difficult to apply with ED-12B/DO-178B were the use 
of dynamic memory allocation / deallocation that is 
used in OOT primarily because it challenges the 
deterministic characteristics of airborne systems. 
Likewise traceability of the design and code, key to 
ED-12B/DO-178B’s verification completeness 
objective, is difficult to demonstrate with OOT 
approaches.  
4. Model Based Design 
Model based design holds the hope of alleviating the 
burden of the costly development of today’s aviation 
systems. Flight test or even tests conducted in 
special test equipment rigs are extremely costly and 
in many cases permit only ‘black box’ testing of the 
product under development, which typically does not 
fully test the robustness of the product.  
 
If we can build a perfect model of the environment 
that the product will operate in, then we can more 
robustly test the product, its modes of operation and 
how it will detect and accommodate faults induced 
by the environment. 
 
The “if” of the previous paragraph is in bold, and 
justifiably so, as it is a very big ‘if’. If we can build a 
perfect model, then we could take credit for testing 
with that model and reduce the costly flight or rig test 
that are currently performed. And yet although we 
know that it is not likely, if we could build a perfect 
model, how would you determine the pedigree of the 
model? This is one aspect of product development 
that ED-12B/DO-178B did not address and as such 
clarification in this area is needed.      
 
 
 
5. Formal Methods 
Formal methods have always held the intrigue that 
we would be able to build a system so precise and 
exact that we know it would be correct. The 
foundations for such a claim are based on the 
specification of the system in a mathematical sense. 
Rushby defines formal methods as mathematically 
based techniques for the specification, development 
and verification of software and hardware systems 
that are based on formal logic, discrete mathematics, 
and computer-readable languages.[5] Formal 
methods allow properties of a system to be predicted 
from a mathematical model of the system.  
 
We can think of formal methods in two parts, formal 
specification and formal verification. In formal 
specification we see the use of mathematics-based 
languages that provide precise, unambiguous 
descriptions of requirements and other development 
objects. In formal verification, we see deduction or 
proof that relies on a discipline that requires the 
explicit enumeration of all assumptions and 
reasoning steps. Formal verification also 
encompasses model checking, which is the process 
of automatically checking whether a given finite 
model of an object satisfies a given property. 
 
Formal methods generally constitute a specification 
language and an accompanying tool or set of tools 
that are consistent, complete, and not ambiguous. 
The benefits promised by such languages and tools 
are the anticipated improvement of requirement 
quality, the reduction of specification errors and the 
permitting of verification techniques, which fully 
explore the behavior of a design. 
 
Yet there are acknowledged limitations, such as not 
being able to fully establish the verification evidence 
for compatibility with the target hardware. Formal 
methods further cannot ensure that a formally 
specified requirement correctly meets its non-formal 
parent requirement(s) and it cannot verify anything 
that is not explicitly stated as a property. Along with 
this is a fear that formalizing requirements or designs 
may increase the effort required to specify them, 
particularly for complex systems. And finally 
although we would like to think we could precisely 
specify the system, somewhere in the life cycle, 
there will be at least some bit of informality. The 
assumptions made in translating requirements or 
designs from the informal to the formal may not be 
clear, or may misrepresent to some degree a 
sufficient model of the real system. 
 
"Traditional software development methods rely on 
human inspection and testing for validation and 
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verification. Formal methods also uses testing, but 
they employ notations and languages that are 
amenable to rigorous analysis, and they exploit 
mechanical tools for reasoning about the properties 
of requirements, specifications, designs, and code. 
Practitioners have been skeptical about the 
practicality of formal methods. Increasingly, 
however, there is evidence that formal methods can 
yield systems of very high dependability in a cost-
effective manner, …."[6] 
 
ED-12B/DO-178B holds very little guidance in the 
area of formal methods. Formal methods are merely 
recognized as alternative methods that admittedly 
have limited applicability to the airborne community 
at the time when ED-12B/DO-178B was written. 
When using formal methods different forms of 
evidence may be used to substantiate its suitability 
in order to meet the intent of certain objectives from 
ED-12B/DO-178B, rather than the actual objectives. 
If a process is used to satisfy ED-12B/DO-178B that 
provides different evidence and does not directly 
meet the objectives, there is a need to demonstrate 
clearly that the alternate process is equivalent. The 
regulatory authorities have been rather 
uncomfortable with such a ‘meet the intent’ 
approach, and as such have been reticent to 
embrace formal methods as a recognized practice 
for airborne system and equipment development.  
7. Software Development and Verification Tools 
We have all recognized that developing systems 
without the assistance of computerized tools would 
be impossible. And the range of sophistication of 
these tools is broad. ED-12B/DO-178B encourages 
the use of such tools, but is cautious when the tools 
are used to reduce or eliminate the objectives set 
forth in ED-12B/DO-178B. 
 
ED-12B/DO-178B divides tools that take some form 
of ‘credit’ for an objective into two categories, that is, 
those tools (development) that can directly affect the 
target software such as an auto-code generator tool, 
and those tools (verification) that can affect the 
verification of the target system. ED-12B/DO_178B 
states that development type tools must be created 
to the same rigor as that software criticality level of 
the target system. It is clear that ED-12B/DO-178B 
wants to assure that any tool taking credit for 
objectives has been qualified, such that its operation 
is correct and can be relied upon. A similar approach 
is taken for verification tools, but the rigor is 
somewhat less. 
 
The cost for developing tools to this rigor can be 
rather high and it has made tool developers reluctant 
to provide their tools as ‘qualified’ to this level 
because of this cost burden.  As such, airborne 
system developers are left with further burdensome 
and costly development practices because they 
cannot take credit for using the tool. The industry 
has recognized that further guidance in the use of 
development and verification tools to reduce system 
development costs is in order to permit a more cost 
effective development yet still one that would yield a 
safe system.[4]  
8. Integrating New Technologies in Legacy 
Guidance 
Since ED-12B/DO-178B’s inception in 1992, it has 
become the foundation for all aviation-based 
systems that contain software components. Its track 
record is exceptional as noted before and as such 
the industry has been reluctant to make significant 
changes to it. An example of this is the work 
conducted by joint SC-190/WG-52, which clarified 
some of the issues with ED-12B/DO-178B, but was 
not permitted to change the core ED-12B/DO-178B 
document.  
 
Even today, joint committee SC-205/WG-71 is trying 
to address the new technology needs of tools, formal 
methods, model-base design and object oriented 
technology yet in a manner that limits somewhat the 
scope of change to ED-12B/DO-178B.  
 
The question arises is how can we keep the core 
tenants of successful guidance such as ED-12B/DO-
178B yet still meet emerging technology needs? 
Further questions arise with regards to new 
technologies that may not even be recognized as 
viable approaches for the aviation domain. The 
solution that SC-205/WG-71 has devised is to 
minimally modify the core of ED-12B/DO-178B and 
provide a technology supplement that has a specific 
interface specification to the core document and 
objectives. 
 
The approach taken is to amend the core document 
in such a way as to be receptive to the introduction 
of new technology. This is being accomplished by 
the production of a technology interface 
specification, which will define what must be 
addressed in a technology supplement to sufficiently 
address the new guidance a technology supplement 
may provide. Figure 2 pictorially shows the 
approach. Any issues that were raised with ED-
12B/DO-178B were recorded in an issue list and the 
four aforementioned technologies were included on 
this issue list. The four technology supplements are 
being developed by sub-groups internal to SC-
205/WG-71 that holds specialists in those areas of 
technology with a firm knowledge of the aviation 
domain and approval authority process. Each of the 
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supplements being developed has participation from 
the certification authorities such that the guidance 
being developed will be one that the certification 
authorities can embrace. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Technology Integration in Core Guidance 
 
5. Conclusion 
A guidance document for developing software in 
airborne systems and equipment, namely ED-
12B/DO-178B has become deeply ingrained in those 
organizations that develop such products. This 
guidance has become a common ground for the 
understanding of developing, verifying, integrating 
and approving this software such that there is a high 
level of confidence in the deployed system’s ability to 
perform its tasks safely.  
 
As new approaches and technologies arise in the 
software development domain of such embedded 
systems an effective means for integrating these 
technologies to the core tenets of ED-12B/DO-178B 
has occurred. Specific areas being worked include 
Software Tools Technology, Model-Based 
Development Technology, Object Oriented 
Technology and Formal Methods. The approach 
taken is to develop technology supplements that 
abide to an overall core document interface 
specification such that the core document can 
effectively be applied to the new technology.  
 
This approach of developing supplemental guidance 
to a core guidance document such as ED-12B/DO-
178B provides a basis for keeping pace with new 
emergent technologies without the need to rewrite 
the core document as these new technologies 
emerge. 
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8. Glossary 
CCA   Common Cause Analysis   
EASA   European Aviation Safety Agency 
EUROCAE European Organization Civil Equipment 
FAA   Federal Aviation Administration 
FHA   Functional Hazard Analysis 
NASA   National Aeronautical Space Agency 
OOT   Object Oriented Technology 
OOTiA  Object-Oriented Tech. in Aviation 
PSAC   Plan for Software Aspects of Certification 
PSSA   Preliminary System Safety Assessment 
SCMP   Software Configure Management Plan 
SDP   Software Development Plan 
SQAP   Software Quality Assurance Plan 
SSA   System Safety Assessment 
SVP   Software Verification Plan 
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